Posts from February 2025.
The Exception to the Barton Doctrine Contained in 28 U.S.C. §959(a) Does Not Apply to State Court Receivers | By: Peter A. Davidson

Q: I am a state court receiver for an LLC that owns a number of apartment buildings, which I am now managing. I have been sued by some tenants and a tenant group. They have not obtained receivership court permission to sue me, which I think is required. They contend that because their claims relate to my managing the business of the LLC they do not need prior permission to sue me and have cited 28 U.S.C. §959(a). Does this federal statute apply to me—a state court receiver?

A: No. 28 U.S.C. §959(a), which is an exception to the Barton Doctrine [Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881)], requiring ...

Arbitration Fee Payment Statute Does Not Apply To Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements | By: Jared W. Slater

There is no greater threat to an employment arbitration than Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which mandates that the party who drafted the arbitration agreement pay the fees and costs of the arbitration within 30 days after the due date.  A failure to do so will result in a “material breach” of the arbitration agreement, which will entitle the non-drafting party (i.e., the employee) the right to withdraw from the arbitration and obtain onerous sanctions against the drafting party (i.e., employer). Employers have no room for error under this statute. 

 In every case prior to ...

Every PAGA Action Has An Individual Component Which May Be Subject To Arbitration | By: Jared W. Slater

Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises Inc. v. Moriana, California courts did not consider the components of a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claim.  In the Viking River opinion, the Court delineated between a “representative PAGA claim” – referring to a PAGA claim based on violations that employees other than the plaintiff had suffered – and an “individual PAGA claim”, which referred to a portion of a PAGA action that is “based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.”  The California Supreme Court followed ...

The Ultra Vires Exception to the Barton Doctrine is Very Narrow | By: Peter A. Davidson

Q:      I am a state court receiver in a case that has been disrupted by a bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy trustee has been threatening to sue me, in the bankruptcy court, for what she claims were negligent actions and to recover alleged preferential transfers. Doesn’t the trustee have to get prior permission from the state receivership court to be able to sue me?

A:      Yes. The Barton Doctrine [ Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) ] provides that a party seeking to sue a receiver must first obtain leave of the appointing court to do so and, absent such leave, no other court has jurisdiction to ...

Equitable Estoppel Can Be Invoked By a Non-Signatory Joint Employer to Compel Arbitration | By: Jared W. Slater

Tell me if you have heard this one before: ten companies are sued by a former employee as “joint employers”, even though the employee technically worked for, and signed a binding arbitration agreement with, only one of them.  The employers then move to compel arbitration and the employee opposes the motion.  The trial court grants or denies the motion to compel and the losing party (or parties) appeal(s).  If this sounds familiar, it is because there are no less than six published appellate court decisions have come down in recent years that have wrestled with the issue of whether joint ...

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